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Zunker: It's Our Water - Can Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the Export

"IT'S OUR WATER!"--CAN WYOMING
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBIT THE EXPORTATION
OF STATE WATERS?*
INTRODUCTION

Water has always been an indispensable ingredient in
the development of the western states. During the last generation, the demands upon surface and ground waters have increased dramatically. It is estimated that, while the water
supply for the entire United States is sufficient to meet foreseeable needs well into the next century, the consumption of
water in the western states is exceeding the estimated dependable supply.' For example, it is estimated that the western
states used 95 percent of the 73 billion gallons per day of
water consumed nationally for irrigation in 1970, and that
their citizens also consumed from 30 to 50 percent more water
than the citizens of the eastern states.' Increasing demands
for water from farmers, ranchers, municipalities, and industry have, no doubt, significantly increased these rates of
consumption.
The federal government has, by and large, left the control and regulation of the use of water to the states,3 and the
Supreme Court has affirmed the wisdom of this policy.4 As
a result, western water users have relied upon state laws relative to water use and water appropriation.
Increasing demands upon these limited water resources
have created a new public consciousness, which, in turn, has
led to demands upon public officials to take steps to preserve
these vital water resources. This public awareness, coupled
with the traditional rights of states to regulate the appropriation and use of water, has resulted in legislation in Wyoming designed to preserve the state's waters for its inhabiCopyright@ 1975 by the University of Wyoming

1.
2.
3.
4.

*This case note was partially financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of the University of Wyoming.
THE WORLD ALMANAC 432 (1974 ed.).
Id.
Trelease. Government Ounerehip and Truatee8hip of Water, 45 CAun'. L.
Rav. 638 (1957).
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1985).
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tants by prohibiting exportation of state waters unless specifically authorized by the state legislature.5
Such a statute creates a serious dilemma. While a state
may be justifiably concerned with preventing the rapid and
uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources,
it does not have unlimited power to exercise its police power
to preserve its natural resources.' The state may exercise its
police powers to prevent waste ;7 however, it may not exercise
that power in such a manner as to restrict or interfere with
interstate commerce.' All such attempts by the states to
stymie the national government or to put their interests above
the national interests or the interests of a sister state have
failed?
Thus, the action which the 1974 Wyoming Legislature
has taken raises a fundamental constitutional question:
whether the prohibition against the exportation of state
waters without special authorization from the state legislature is a legitimate exercise of the police power, or whether
it is an interference with and an unreasonabe burden upon
interstate commerce.
Two contrary views exist on the issue of the constitutionality of such a statute. The older of these two views upholds
§ 41-10.5 (Supp. 1974). The statute reads as follows:
§ 41-10.5. Applications for use of water outside the state.(a) All water being the property of the state and part of the
natural resources of the state shall be controlled and managed by
the state for the purpose of protecting and assuring the maximum
permanent beneficial use of waters within the state.
(b) None of the water of the state either surface or underground may be appropriated, stored or diverted for use outside of
the state or for use as a medium of transportation of mineral,
chemical or other products to another state without the specific
prior approval of the legislature on the advice of the state engineer.
(c) No holder of either a permit to appropriate water or a
certificate to appropriate water, nor any applicant for a right to
appropriate the unappropriated water of this state, may transfer
or use the water so appropriated, certificated or applied for outside
the State of Wyoming without prior aproval of the legislature of
Wyoming, provided further, that as a prerequisite to any use or
transfer any adjoining state in which any such water is used shall
grant reciprocal rights for the use of water in Wyoming.
15 AM. JuIR.2d Commerce § 77 (1964) and cases cited therein.
Annot., 24 A.L.R. 307 (1923); Annot., 78 A.L.R. 834 (1932).
15 AM. Jua.2d Commerce § 77 (1964) and cases cited therein.
Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government--States' Rights
vs. National Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189 (1965).

5. WYO.

6.
7.
8.
9.

STAT.
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such a prohibition as a legitimate exercise of the police
power."0 In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCartor, the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute which read as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits,
ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh water lake,
pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this State into
any other State, for use therein."
In so doing, it enforced an injunction sought by the State of
New Jersey which prevented the appellant from withdrawing
three million gallons of water a day from the Passaic River
and delivering it to the City of New York pursuant to a contract entered into between appellant and the city after the
statute had been adopted.
In upholding the statute's constitutionality, the Court
both expressly and impliedly relied upon the following theories. First, there is a great public interest in preserving the
water and forests within a state's territory. 2 Secondly, the
Court said that if it were a legitimate exercise of the state
police power to regulate the taking of wild animals, even to
the point of prohibiting their being taken in-state and shipped
out of state," then it should be able to protect its water and
forests from interference in the name of property by statute. 4
Thirdly, the Court said that this principle of public interest
and the exercise of the police power provides a greater justification for regulation than does any theory of the right of the
state to act as a quasi-sovereign.' Lastly, there appears to
be an even more fundamental view which is latent in the
Court's opinion that water is not an article of commerce until
it is actually started to a point outside the state which initially
seeks to regulate it."
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1895).
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 356.
Id. at 355.
Although language to this effect does not appear in McCarter, this conclusion is supported by language employed in the dissent in Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600 (1922), by Mr. Justice Holmes, the author
of the McCarter opinion.
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The more recent view, invoving a statute which sought
to prohibit the exportation of state water, is that such a statute is an unconstitutional interference with and an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. In Altus v. Carr,17
the Supreme Court, per curiam and without opinion, affirmed
the decision of a three-judge federal district court striking
down a Texas statute which had been passed after the plaintiff had entered into a contract with a Texas resident to purchase his ground water and export it to Oklahoma. The offending statute read as follows:
No one shall withdraw water from any underground source in this State for use in any other state
by drilling a well in Texas and transporting the
water outside the boundaries of the State unless the
same be specificaly authorized by an Act of the Texas
Legislature and thereafter as approved by it. 8
While appearing to limit its holding to the question of
the statute's interference with the transportation and use of
ground water after it has been withdrawn from a well and
has become personal property, 9 the federal district court,
nonetheless, assumed a substantially different view of the
propriety of a state's attempt to restrict the exportation of
state waters from that of the Supreme Court in McCarter.
This divergent view seems to have rested upon the following
theories. First, the district court considers water to be an
article of commerce."0 Secondly, the district court did not
find a sufficient public interest to support the state action.2
Finally, the federal district court said that, in any event, such
a statutory attempt to restrict water exportation was an impermissible22 interference with and burden upon interstate
commerce.

The first portion of this article sets out in detail those
arguments growing out of McCarter and those growing out of
public policy which may be advanced in support of statutory
17.
18.
19.
"20.
21.
22.

255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 885 U.S. 35 (1966).

Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

839.
840.
839.
840.
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prohibitions against the exportation of state waters. The
second part of the article details those arguments which support the conclusion that such statutory prohibitions are constitutionally impermissible. The third part of the article sets
forth reasons why the Supreme Court's per curiam affirmation of the Altus opinion has not necessarily overruled McCarter sub silentio. Finally, assuming that McCarter has not
been overruled, but that the rationale of McCarter must be
reassessed, the last part of the article considers the constitutionality of the Wyoming statute in light of those tests
currently employed by the Supreme Court to determine
whether or not a particular activity is a legitimate exercise
of the police power or is an impermissible interference with
the scope of the commerce clause. 3
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PROHIBITING
EXPORTATION OF STATE WATERS AS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER
The specific holding of McCarter clearly permits a state
to prohibit the exportation of those waters found within its
boundaries on the theory that a state may in the public
interest and as a proper exercise of its police power prohibit
such exportation.2 4 The purpose of this section is to examine
the arguments of Mcarterand other policy arguments which
may be used to support the constitutionality of the Wyoming
statute.
The State Ownership Argument
First, it may be said that because the state owns the
water in Wyoming,2" it may legitimately prescribe rules and
regulations relative to its use.2" Furthermore, because this
ownership is more like that of a trustee than of a proprietor,2 7
it exists for the benefit of the people of the state. Thus, in
the exercise of that ownership the state has an obligation to
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24. See text pp. 135-46 for the critical analysis of these arguments and those
appearing in pp. 128-32.
25. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
26. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 356.
27. Merrill v. Bishop, 287 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1955).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 4

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

promote the public convenience and prosperity. 8 It also has
the obligation to preserve a valuable natural resource, 9 and
few public interests are more indisputable or independent of
property theory than the public interest in maintaining those
rivers or other water sources, wholly within a state's boundaries, in a condition which is substantially undiminished except by such drafts upon them as the state, as guardian of the
public welfare, may permit for the purpose of turning them
to a more perfect use."° Therefore, it is arguably a legitimate
exercise of the state police power for the legislature to determine that exportation of state waters is not in the public welfare because it does not promote a more perfect use of this
valuable natural resource.
Furthermore, because the state -owns the water, the appropriator can acquire only a limited ownership in the
water. 1 He is like the taker of wild animals in that he has
no pre-existing right to the water he seeks to appropriate, 2
for the appropriator must take his permit subject to those
conditions and limitations which the legislature has seen
fit to impose. It is only after he has received a permit from
the State Engineer that the appropriator may be said to have
a property interest. 4 Even then, that right is merely a right
to use the water 3 and not to its corpus. 6 Since the use of
that water may be initially limited by the state, 7 and since
the appropriator cannot enlarge this limited and qualified
right once he has received it," it is probable that there is no
unconstitutional deprivation of any right of the appropriator
nor any interference with interstate commerce.
The Local Concern Argument
Another argument supporting the contention that the
statute does not violate the commerce clause is that it deals
28. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915).
29. Geer v. Connecticut, supra note 13, at 534.
30. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10.
31, Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764
(1925).
32. State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (1894).
33. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supra note 31, at 770.
34. WYO. STAT. § 41-138 (Supp. 1973); WYo. STAT. § 41-201 (1957).
35. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supra note 31, at 770.
36. Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
37. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10.
38. Id. at 357.
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solely with a matter of local concern over which the state may
properly exercise its police power. For example, both Congress and the Constitution recognize the sovereignty of the
state in local regulation for the protection of natural resources. 9 Where states are subject to interstate water compacts, the Congress has recognized the rights of the states to
regulate and control those waters within their jurisdictions."0
The Supreme Court has also recognized the rights of states
to regulate their water resources.' In short, there may be
said to exist a right of the state to prohibit the exportation
of those waters found wholly within its boundaries- a right
which the federal government should recognize as a legitimate regulation of a matter of local concern.
However, assuming that the statute can be shown to
touch interstate commerce, it is arguable that the statute is
still a legitimate exercise of the police power because of the
significant public interest in regulating a matter of local
concern whose effect upon interstate commerce is only indirect and incidental." The prohibition against the use of
state waters to transport minerals, chemicals or other products out of the state without the prior approval of the legislature" does not prevent their transportation out of state
by more conventional means. Neither does the statute prevent items of commerce from moving into the state. iNor does
the statute prevent these items from being exported out of
state on the navigable waterways of the state.
Rather, it may be said the statute simply implies that
the use of its water as a conduit for moving other natural resources or products out of the state is not a per se beneficial
use of the state's waters. Therefore, before such a use will
be permitted, the legislature, upon the advice of the State
Engineer, will have to determine if such a proposed use is
beneficial. For, the argument goes, the legislature and not
the appropriator has the right to determine if such a use, or
39. Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771, 776 (D. Md. 1957), aff'd, 355 U.S. 37
(1957).
40. 43 U.S.C. § 617(q) (1971).
41. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 4.
42. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
43. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5 (Supp. 1974).
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any other use of state waters outside the state, promotes a
more perfect use,"' is in the public's water interest," or is,
instead, detrimental to the public welfare." In other words,
the state, it is said, should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures. 7 So long
as the local benefit which the statute is designed to achieve
outweighs a minor inconvenience to interstate commerce, the
statute must be seen as a legitimate exercise of the police
power."8 The commerce clause does not require the state to
yield to the mere convenience and advantage of particular
industries when it may reasonably consider conservation to
be of paramount importance."
The Public Policy Arguments
Another line of argument in favor of the constitutionality
of such prohibitions is that, even though the statute does discriminate against those who intend to use Wyoming water
out of state by requiring them to get the prior approval of the
legislature, there are substantial, valid and independent reasons for doing so." These reasons grow out of a substantial
public interest and are based upon desirable public policy.
For example, when water is appropriated for use within
the state, the state derives a variety of economic benefits
therefrom. The state experiences increased production and
property values. These, in turn, generate more income for the
state's residents and more revenue for the state. Such advantages must necessarily be considered an integral part of the
concept of a beneficial use. Thus, it is contended, the state
must be permitted the right to determine whether or not proposed uses of state waters outside the state will generate economic benefits of a similar nature for the state.
Another policy reason which may be said to justify the
statutory restrictions derives from the paradoxical nature of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10.
WYo. STAT. § 41-139 (Supp. 1973).
WYO. STAT. § 41-203 (1957).
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
Corsa v. Tawes, supra note 39, at 776.
Id. at 777.
Toomer, v. Witsell, eupra note 47, at 396.
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water. On the one hand, water is commonplace. It is found
in sufficient quantities in all states to permit some economic
development. No state is so devoid of water that its very economic livelihood must depend upon those surface or ground
waters found wholly within the boundaries of a sister state.
There is no justifiable reason which should require that sister
state to sacrifice its future growth for the immediate growth
of the requesting state.
On the other hand, water is unique. Unlike any other
natural resource there can be no growth without it. For that
reason, those states which are part of an interstate water
system are assured by the federal government through various
water compacts and by the Supreme Court through its holdings that they will have access to an equitable portion of the
waters within those systems. These compacts and court holdings suggest other vital concepts. One is that no state will be
permitted to substantially impair or deprive a sister state of
those natural resources necessary to its development. 5 1 Another is that the federal government has generally been willing
to allow the states to regulate the appropriation and use of
those waters found within their boundaries. 2 Most importantly, the compacts and the holdings reflcct federal acceptance of the unique nature of water as a natural resource in
that neither the Government nor the courts have allowed such
state latitude with respect to other natural resources. 3 Thus,
it is arguable that such policies must permit a state to pass
prohibition statutes such as Wyoming's as an attestation that
water is the one building block which is essential to the economic growth of any state, municipality, industry or agricultural endeavor.
Additionally, public policy must permit water to be
treated as a resource which is different from all other resources and to allow the states to regulate the ways in which
it will permit this unique natural resource to be exploited,
51. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906).
52. 43 U.S.C. § 617(q) (1971); California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., supra note 4.
53. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1910); Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 533 (1922); State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana
and Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E. 778 (1889).
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even if such regulation incidentally and indirectly affects
interstate commerce. Public policy must require the federal
government to continue to refrain from interfering in the
state's regulation of this particular natural resource. These
public interests are especially strong when that resource is
owned by the state for the beneficial use of its people and the
federal government has recognized this ownership. 4
The ""Water Is Not a Commodity" Argument
A final argument which may be advanced in support of

such prohibitions as a legitimate exercise of the state police
power is that water has not been treated as a commodity or
article of interstate commerce. 5 WhiJe navigable waterways
have long been subject to the commerce clause,5" water itself
has not been viewed as subject to the clause. Rather, decisions
involving interstate water problems have been decided upon
concepts of the sovereign power." The major water cases
have involved navigable interstate streams" and have not
spoken of water in terms of a commodity of interstate commerce. Therefore, there is no precedent for the federal district court's treatment in Altus of water as a commodity of
interstate commerce.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FINDING THE
PROHIBITION

OF EXPORTATION OF STATE WATERS TO BE AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AND A
BURDEN UPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The demarcation line which separates the legitimate exercise by the state of the police power from an unreasonable interference by the state in interstate commerce cannot be determined by any general formula." Nonetheless, there are
certain guiding principles which, when applied to a given fact
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.. supra note 4,
at 162; Merrill v. Bishop, supra note 27, at 624.
This is the view implicit in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra
note 10.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Trelease, supra note 3, at 651.
Kansas v. Colorado, supra note 51; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1962).
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 355.
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situation, assist in the determination of whether a particular
action by the state is within its police power or is outside it
and is, therefore, unconstitutional. This section considers
those arguments which may he advanced in support of the
view that such statutory prohibitions of water use are unconstitutional.
"Water Is an Article and Instrumentality of Comnmerce"
Argument
First, it may be asserted that water is both an article and
an instrumentality of commerce, and, as such, is subject to
regulation under the commerce clause. For example, it has
becn held that natural resources are commodities of interstate commerce,"0 especially when they have assumed a form
which is suited for interstate transportation." Once the
transformation has occurred, it has been held that no state can
keep that commodity within its borders by passing a law forbidding its interstate transportation. 2 It does not matter if
the natural resource is gas"a or water."
Because the Wyoming statute explicitly recognizes water
as a part of the natural resources of the state,65 it may be
argued that Wyoming water is capable of becoming a commercial commodity according to the general rule. Thus, it
may be contended that, because the statute interferes with and
burdens the use of that commodity in interstate commerce,66
it is unconstitutional."7
Furthermore, mediums of transportation are instrumentalities of interstate commerce,68 which are subject to the
commerce clause." Arguably, this statute seeks to prohibit
60. Altus v. Carr, supra note 17; Oklahoma v. Kanssa Natural Gas Co., sulyra
note 53; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra note 53.
61. State ex. rel. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co.. supra
note 53.
62. Id. at 779.
63. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co., supra
note 53.
64. Altus v. Carr, supra note 17.
65. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(a) (Supp. 1974).
66. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(b) (Supp. 1974).
67. Altus v. Carr, supra note 17, at 839.
68. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 999 (1871).
69. Id.
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or interfere with or place a burden upon the use of state
waters as a medium of transportation."' The Supreme
Court has held that state regulations which obstruct the interstate operations of transportation or which adversely affect transportation to the detriment of the national interest
in efficiency and economy are unconstitutional." Therefore,
it may be maintained that the Wyoming statute is unconstitutional because it interferes with an instrumentality of interstate commerce to the detriment of the national interest in efficiency and economy.
The Disorimination Argument
The statute may also be considered unconstitutional because it discriminates against a single type of water user."
Disparities in treatment are permissible, but only when those
discriminated against are a peculiar source of the evil which
the statute seeks to regulate.78 Moreover, such discrimination
requires an adequate explanation before it will be sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power. 4
Measured against this standard, it may be said that the
statute unreasonaby discriminates because there is nothing in
the statute which indicates that the out of state use to which
the water may be put is more harmful to the state than an
in-state use. While the statute implies that the use of water as
a medium of transportation is not one which will assure the
maximum permanent beneficial use of waters within the
state," there is no prohibition against using Wyoming water
to transport mineral, chemical or other products within the
state. Thus, there appears to be no adequate explanation for
this discrimination. "In the name of conservation the statute seeks to prohibit interstate shipment of water while indulging in the substantial discrimination of permitting the
unrestricted intrastate production and transportation of
WYo. STAT. § 41-10.5(b) (Supp. 1974).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1944).
Wyo. STAT. § 41-10.5(b), (c) (Stpp. 1974).
Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 47, at 398.
Edwards v. Leaver, 102 F. Supp. 698, 702 (D. R.I. 1952).
75. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1974).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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water.... "" Such a discrimination against an article or instrumentality of commerce is unconstitutional."

The "Close and Substantial Relation" Argument
Lastly, it may be asserted that the statute fails to
pass constitutional muster when it is measured against the
so-called "close and substantial relation" test. Here, the
critical factor is not if the statutory purpose is to regulate an
activity which may be intrastate when considered separately,
but if the activity which the statute seeks to regulate has
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
that it is essential and appropriate for Congress to exercise
control over the activity in order to protect commerce from

burdens and obstructions."8 When a statute proceeds to regulate commerce, it is exercising the very power granted to
Congress and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.79 Therefore, it is not necessary that Congress
have enacted legislation in the particular area before the
commerce clause will protect against state legislation which
is inimical to the national interest."
This standard is a particularly appropriate touchstone
when the challenged statute purports only to regulate a matter of local concern,"1 or only to affect interstate commerce
indirectly rather than directly." Consequently, a statute may
be recognized to touch upon a local concern and still come
under the purview of the commerce clause.83 This is especially
true when the statute purports to conserve or preserve a
natural resource.84 Such statutes may bear a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce in that they attempt
to halt commerce at state lines. 5
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Altus v. Carr, supra note 17, at 840.
Id.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 56.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 71, at 769.
Altus v. Carr, supra note 17.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra note 42.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., eupra note 78.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53.
State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co.,

note 53.
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Where the real motivation of such statutes is actually
the commercial conservation and preservation of the natural
resource,"6 the close and substantial relation test becomes
critical. For it has been said that if such a regulation were
recognized as a legitimate local concern, not subject to the
commerce clause, then nothing would keep any other state
from keeping its corn, wheat, cotton, fruit, lead, iron, or petroleum within its borders.Y To permit this would be to permit the destruction of interstate commerce." Arguably it is
just exactly this kind of thing which the Wyoming statute appears to do,8 9 and it is precisely this kind of invidious restraint which the Constitution prohibits."
Nonetheless, it may still be said in support of the statute
that even though it appears to affect interstate commerce, it
does so indirectly; therefore, the measure of interference
should not be the magnitude of the cause or effect, but the
manner in which the effect is brought about.' This argument is no longer recognized by the Supreme Court." Thus,
the Wyoming statute which, on the surface, appears to regulate a local matter and to touch upon interstate commerce only
indirectly, may be unconstitutional because it actually bears
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
that it is in the national interest that Congress regulate the
activity. 3
THE PROBLEM OF

McCarter AND Altus

The language and certainly the intent of the Texas statute which the federal district court declared unconstitutional
in Altus is virtually identical to that in the New Jersey statute in McCarter and that in the Wyoming statute. Thus, it
is necessary to show that Altus has not overruled McCarter
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 8upra note 53, at 255.
State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co., supra
note 53, at 779.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53, at 255.
WYo. STAT. § 41-10.5 (Supp. 1974).
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra note 53.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra note 42.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., supra note 78; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 78.
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sub silentio in order to prevent the Wyoming statute from
being considered unconstitutional on its face. This section
suggests reasons why it may be argued that Altus has not
overrruled McCarter. However, before those arguments can
be set forth, it is necessary to confront serious questions which
are raised in Altus.
While it is true that Altus, when read closely, indicates
that the federal district court limited its holding,"4 it may
well be that to rely upon such an argument is too legalistic.
Certainly, such an argument seems to ignore the bulk of the
court's discussion. Read broadly, there can be little doubt
that the district court placed water in exactly the same category of natural resources as natural gas, for the entire analysis 5 of the Texas statute amounts to little more than extensive quotations from the leading natural gas cases which
struck down attempts by gas-producing states to prohibit
exportation for the benefit of its citizens. As far as the Altus
court was concerned, water was like natural gas in that it
was viewed as an article of commerce, and its transmission
in interstate commerce was viewed as interstate commerce.96
Additionally, it cannot be overlooked that the federal district court was unwilling to be persuaded by the reasoning in
McCarter,,7 and that on appeal the Supreme Court may also
have been unwilling to be further bound by the rationale of
McCarter. Because the district court in Altus chose to rest
its holding upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
natural gas cases,9" which developed after McCarter,the possibility exists that the per curiam affirmation indicates the
Supreme Court's own willingness to abandon McCarter.
Credence is given to this argument when it is noted that the
Supreme Court itself refused to extend McCarter to the
natural gas cases.9 9 Finally, it may be significant that the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Altus v. Carr, supra note 17, at 839.
Id. at 837-39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
supra note 53.
99. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53, at 258.
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theory of interstate commerce, upon which Justice iHolmes
implicity relied' °0 in McCarter, is now outmoded.''
However there is nothing in these Supreme Court decisions which conclusively determines that the Court has abandoned McCarter in water regulation cases. In fact, the Supreme Court has implied that there is a fundamental difference between water and natural gas as natural resources, and
that this difference is sufficient to allow the states to prohibit
the exportation of water even though the same rationale
will not permit them to prohibit the exportation of natural
gas." 2 Thus, this apparent distinction itself becomes an initial reason for suggesting that the Supreme Court's affirmation of Altus has not overruled McCarter.
Another reason for suggesting that Altus has not
overruled McCarter is that the former, and the natural gas
cases upon which it relies, are deeply rooted in a property
theory, and the Supreme Court has traditionally refused to
decide conflicts between states over water on property theories."' Instead, it has decided such cases on the basis of a
proper allocation of the sovereign powers. 0 4 The question
has not been one of ownership of water but of the power of
the federal government and of the appropriate exercise
thereof.'
Thirdly, while navigable waters have long been recognized as subject to the commerce clause,' there is no indication that water itself is to be treated as a commodity of
interstate commerce. Excepting Altus, there is no precedent
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Although no view of interstate commerce is expressed in McCarter, in
Pennsylvania v. West Virignia, supra note 53, at 600, Holmes, in dissent,
argued that products of a state, until actually started to a point outside it,
were not objects of interstate commerce and could be regulated by the
state. This view had its origin in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888),
where the Court expressed the view that interstate commerce consisted
only of buying, selling, and transporting gcods, and did not include the
preparation of the product for such activity.
United States v. Darby, supra note 92. at 113.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53, at 258-60.
Trelease, supra note 3, at 651.
Id.
Id.
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 56.
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to suggest that the Supreme Court has
changed its fundamen1 7
tal view of the uniqueness of water. 1
On the contrary, given the Supreme Court's penchant
for limiting its holdings to the facts before it and for authoring lengthy opinions when it moves to alter dramatically a
longstanding legal view, it seems reasonable to say that Altus
is not intended to be seen as overruling McCarter.It cannot be
overlooked that Altus was before the Court on direct appeal.
The Court had to confront it. It could not avoid the holding.
The Court may well have affirmed solely on the basis of the
narrow holding in Altus without adopting the broader language of the decision. While there is a danger that this kind
of reasoning is too legalistic, it is no more strained than to
say that the Supreme Court has abandoned a long-held view
and adopted, without so much as a word, an entirely new view
of the right of the states to regulate the use of their water.
This seems to be particularly possible when the new view is
embodied in a federal district court decision which is marked
by its mixture of sweeping generalizations and narrow holding and by its incomplete analysis.
Nonetheless, these arguments must be tempered. While
the Supreme Court has implied that a separate standard is
to be used where a statute prohibits the exportation of water,
the truth may be that such a statement is more a symptom of
stare decisis than of a strong commitment to the wisdom of
that view. It may be that, by affirming Altus, the Court has
signalled the direction it intends to take when another case
like McCarter comes before it and the issue is deemed ripe
for adjudication. Until such time, it is doubtful that by affirming Altus per curiam and without opinion, the Supreme
Court has tacitly overruled McCarter.
THE STATUS OF THE WYOMING STATUTE

As the discussion above has attempted to indicate, strong
arguments can be made that the Supreme Court has not
107. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 356; Oklahoma
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53, at 258-60.
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adopted the broad language of Altus which treats water as
any other natural resource. However, this conclusion is not
meant to imply that the court will continue to follow McCarter
in toto when another case comes before it, in which a similar
prohibition against the exportation of water is challenged,
and the Court decides that the entire concept embodied in
McCarteris ripe for review. Therefore, a valid reason exists
for considering the scope and intent of the Wyoming statute
in light of current Court doctrine on the reach of the commerce clause, rather than just in terms of McCarter and
Altus.
Certain Basic Premises
Before reviewing the Wyoming statute in light of contemporary commerce clause doctrine, it is necessary to set
down certain basic premises which will be essential to that
review. The first is that because of its paradoxical nature,
water is a unique natural resource. Another premise is that
both the federal and the state governments traditionally have
treated water differently from other resources where regulation or use is involved. A third premise is that such special
treatment is justified and should permit a greater degree of
infringement upon commerce than is permitted when other
natural resources are involved. However, there will still
exist a boundary at which conflicting interests balance, °8 so
that a statute, such as the one here considered, may fall on
either side of that boundary.'
Thus, the purpose of this
section is to apply the current commerce clause doctrines to
the statute in order to determine if the purpose it seeks to
achieve falls on the nearer or farther side of that boundary
and is a permissible exercise of the police power or is an impermissible interference with and burden upon interstate
commerce.
The Significance of the State Interest
The logical place to begin an analysis of the statute in
light of current commerce clause doctrine is to look to see if
108. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 355.
109. Id.
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the statute seeks to protect a significant state interest. According to its own terms, the express purpose of the statute is
to protect and to assure the maximum beneficial use of those
waters within the state."1 It is settled that a state may enact
a statute whose purpose is to conserve, protect, control, and
regulate the use, development and appropriation of water for
beneficial and public purposes and to prevent waste and unreasonable use of water. 1 ' Since few public interests grow
more pressing as population grows or are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the public interest in the wise and judicious use of a state's water
resources for the benefit of its citizens," 2 the statute may be
said to have a legitimate purpose. It seeks, on its face, to
protect a significant state interest.
A second elemental consideration is whether or not the
prohibitions of the statute affect either an article or an instrumentality of commerce. This requires a two-pronged
analysis. First, the prohibition must be considered as it
applies to the use of water as a medium of transportation.
Secondly, it must be considered as it applies to the use of
water generally outside the state.
If such a consideration determines that neither use which
the statute seeks to restrict is an article or instrumentality of
commerce, then the conclusion must be that there is no violation of the commerce clause. The commerce clause does not
operate upon activities which occur wholly within the state."1 '
The Effect of the Statute on the Use of Water as a Medium of
Transportation
The statute expressly states that no waters of the state
shall be used as a medium of transportation of mineral, chemical or other product to another state without the specific
approval of the legislature." 4 This type of restriction is unlike any found in the statutes discussed in MeCarter and
110. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(a) (Supp. 1974).
111. Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (1962).
112. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, supra note 10, at 356.
113. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 56.
114. WYo. STAT. § 41-10.5(b) (Supp. 1974).
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Altus. To that extent, neither case would be controlling, and
this restriction must, of necessity, be considered on its own
terms with respect to current commercial clause doctrines.
First of all, such a restriction must necessarily be said
to touch an instrumentality of commerce, since a medium of
transportation to another state is, by its own force, an instrumentality of interstate commerce and subject to the reach
of the commerce clause."' The power of the commerce clause
is the power to regulate and when a state proceeds to regulate
commerce among the several states, "it is exercising the very
power that is granted to congress, and is doing the very thing
which congress is authorized to do..... The attempt to place
restrictions upon the use of state waters as a medium of
transportation of products out of the state is an unconstitutional interference with and burden upon interstate commerce.
The proposed restriction is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, if a state cannot impose restrictions similar to
the one found in the Wyoming statute upon trains moving in
interstate commerce," 7 it most certainly should not be able to
impose them upon water when it is to be used as a medium
of transportation moving in interstate commerce. Secondly,
the restriction upon the use of water as a medium of interstate transportation is inherently discriminatory. It is entirely possible that state waters may be used as a medium of
transportation of mineral, chemical or other products within
the state without requiring legislative approval. While a state
may discriminate between in-state and out of state users,
there must be sufficient justification for such discrimination." 8 Because the restriction imposes a discrimination
against interstate commerce without substantial justification,
the provision providing that none of the water of the state
may be used as a medium of transportation to another state
without legislative approval is most likely unconstitutional.
The burden appears to be clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits the restriction purports to assure."
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

The Daniel Ball, supra note 68.
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 56, at 199-200.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 71.
Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 47, at 396.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss1/4

20

Zunker: It's Our Water - Can Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the Export

1975

COMMENTS

The Effect of the Statute on the General Use of Water Outside the State
The newly enacted statute also requires legislative approval for any other use of state waters outside of the state.12°
These potential uses, unlike the use of water as a medium of
transportation, do not of their own force qualify as an article of commerce or as an instrumentality of commerce. Thus,
it must be determined if water may properly be classified as
a commodity or article of commerce.
Water is a natural resource, and natural resources have
traditionally been treated as commodities and articles of
commerce. I A look at the way in which water is handled
and used suggests an approach which is no different from
that given to other natural resources. Water is capable of
being bought and sold much like natural gas. For example, it
is sold daily to household users and to industrial users. Because it is subject to such ordinary business functions, water
may be regarded as an article of commerce, and the restrictions which the Wyoming statute seeks to place upon its use
may be said to affect commerce. The problem is whether
that burden is so unreasonable as to require that the restriction be declared unconstitutional.
It is apparent that the restrictions imposed upon the
out of state uses by the statute impose a burden upon com-

merce. In the first place, the contention that the restrictions
are no burden because they are a necessary adjunct to those
other statutes and regulations which govern the appropriation
and use of state water is unconvincing. A close review of a
2
selected few of the applicable statutes"'
indicates that there

exists sufficient statutory authority to ensure that the state's
waters will not be wasted or unreasonably exploited. On the
one hand, the statutes restrict all uses to beneficial uses.' 8
On the other hand, they give ample authority to the State
120. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(b), (c) (Supp. 1974).
121. See the natural gas cases in note 53 supra.
122. WYO. STAT. §§ 41-2 to -3, -201 to -203 (1957); Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-4.1, -124,
-126,-129,-138,-139 (Supp. 1973).
123. WYo. STAT. § 41-2 (1957).
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Engineer to determine if a use will be in the public interest 12 4
or if it will, instead, tend to impair the value of existing
rights or be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare." 5
They also provide for a review of any subsequent transfer of
use of a water right in order to assure that the state and the
public interests are protected.'
Therefore, to impose these
additional restrictions serves no legitimate state interest and
must be classified as a burden upon commerce.
Secondly, the restriction against the use of water generally outside the state without legislative approval is discriminatory. To the extent that the statute discriminates
against this out of state use, it may be said to place a burden
upon commerce. The question is whether that burden, like
the burden upon the use of water as a medium of transportation in interstate commerce, is also so burdensome and bears
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce '
that it too must be stricken as an unconstitutional interference with and an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. However, this determination must be made in light
of the fact that water is a unique natural resource which has
been given special treatment by both the state and federal
governments and that, as such, the state should be able to
place a substantially greater burden upon its use and appropriation before that burden is declared unconstitutional.
The Flaw in the State Ownership Argument
Probably the most typical argument made in support of
the statutory restrictions which have been placed upon the
use of water outside the state is based upon the concept that
all property in the water of the state resides in the state." 8
The argument goes that the appropriator has never had a
property or possessory interest in state water prior to appropriation.. and that even after appropriation the user has
only a right to use the water and not to the water itself, sub124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

WYo. STAT. § 41-139 (Supp. 1973).
WYo. STAT. § 41-203 (1957).
WYo. STAT. § 41-4.1 (Supp. 1973).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 78, at 37.
WYo. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, supra note 36.
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ject to the rules and regulations which the state has seen fit
Therefore, when the state requires
to impose upon that use.'
that any applicant or holder of a permit to appropriate state
waters for use outside the state comply with these additional
provisions which require reciprocity in adjoining states and
approval of the legislature, the state is exercising a legitimate
power for the purpose of preserving and regulating an important resource.
The last part of this argument is that the statute is not
in conflict with the holdings of the gas cases and of Altus because in those cases no state claimed all property in either the
gas or the water of the state because of a statutory or constitutional declaration to that effect. It is said that in those
cases the water or the natural gas either belonged to the surface owner or was subject to the law of capture.
However, there are problems with relying upon this line
of argument in order to support the contention that the burden
is not so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional. First, the
concept of state ownership is merely a fiction expressive of
the importance to the people that a state have the power to
preserve and regulate the exploitation of important resources. 3 ' More importantly, the particular property theory
which a state has adopted with respect to its water should not
make any significant difference in determining whether or
not a statute unreasonably burdens or interferes with interstate commerce. The right to engage in interstate commerce
is not a gift of the state, nor is it something that can be
regulated or restrained by the state. 2 Therefore, the issue is
not one of property or ownership,'
but of accommodating
the competing demands of the state and national interests involved.'3 If the activity the statute prohibits or restricts in
order to accommodate that state interest has such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce," 5 then the national interest will require that the statute be declared unconstitutional.
180. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., supre note 31, at 770.
131. Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 47, at 402.
132. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra note 53, at 260.
133. Trelease, supra note 3, at 652-53.
134. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).
135. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 78, at 37.
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The "Local Interest v. the National Interest" Problem
The first question, then, is whether the prohibition
against the appropriation, storage, or diversion of the water
of the state for use outside the state without reciprocal rights
being granted by the recipient state... consitutes a significant
enough local interest to outweigh any competing national
interest. If so, this portion of the statute should be upheld." 7
Strong policy arguments support the contention that
there is such a significant local interest. On the one hand, it
is arguable that the granting of permits for use of water outside the state, absent reciprocal rights from the benefiting
state13 is not in the public's water interest, 1 9 but is detrimental to the public welfare and interest. ' Availability of water
in sufficient quantities is essential for social and economic
development. Water taken out of the state to develop industry, agriculture or other forms of economic activity elsewhere deters or denies similar activity in Wyoming. Thus,
requiring recipocal rights, it may be asserted, provides a possible source of water should the need arise. The restriction
can be viewed as a form of cost to the appropriating state in
exchange for benefits received as a result of the use of Wyoming water outside the state.
It is doubtful that this provision of the statute requiring
reciprocity is inimical to the national interest or national
commerce. 41 It is questionable if the national interest is better served by requiring one state to sacrifice the one natural
resource absolutely essential to its own economic growth in
order to promote the same kind of growth in a sister state.
No state should be compelled to structure its laws for the
mere convenience and advantage of a particular industry 42
or for a sister state.
On the other hand, it is also probable that when such
local interest and public well-being exist and when the Federal
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

WYo. STAT. § 41710.5(b), (c)__(Supp_1974).
Parker v. Brown, supra note 134, at 362.
WYo. STAT. § 41-10.5(c) (Supp. 1974).
Wyo. STAT. § 41-139 (Supp. 1973).
WYO. STAT. § 41-203 (1957).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, -supranote 71, at 769.
Corsa v. Tawes, supra note 39, at 777.
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Congress has not legislated in the area and practical difficulties indicate the matter may never be adequately dealt with by
It is also
Congress, the local regulation should be upheld.'
arguable that any adverse effect on interstate commerce is
only incidental and indirect and is outweighed by the local
benefits the provision is designed to achieve.'
In any event,
even if the provision does place a significant burden upon
commerce, that burden, in light of water's unique attributes
and its previous special treatment as a natural resource, is
not so unreasonable as to constitute an impermissible interference with and burden upon interstate commerce.
The second question is whether the prohibition against
the appropriation, storage, or diversion of the water of the
state for use outside the state without prior legislative approval... constitutes a sufficient enough local interest to pass
constitutional muster. Unfortunately, it is this portion of
the statute which sweeps too broadly and is most probably
unconstitutional.
While it may not be unreasonable or impermissible to
require reciprocal rights be granted to Wyoming residents
by those states who benefit from their citizens' appropriation of Wyoming water, it may well be an unreasonable
burden upon and interference with interstate commerce to
require any prospective diverter of Wyoming water for use
outside the state to get legislative approval. The avowed purpose of the statute, to protect and to assure the maximum
permanent beneficial use of waters within the state, can be
accomplished when the water is to go outside the state just
as easily within the framework of existing statutes . 6 without
imposing the additional burden of going to the state legislature for its specific approval. For example, there are specific
statutory instructions to the State Engineer ' 7 to protect and
to assure the maximum permanent benefical use of state
waters. There are also sufficient provisions to protect those
143. Parker v. Brown, sup-ra note 134, at 362.
144. Corsa v. Tawes, oupra note 39, at 776-77.
145. WYO. STAT. § 41-10.5(b), (c) (Supp. 1974).
146. WYo. STAT. §§ 41-2 to -3, -201 to -203 (1957); WYO. STAT. §§ 41-4.1, -124,
-126, -129, -138, -139 (Supp. 1973).
147. WYO. STAT. § 41-126 (Supp. 1973):
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interests should there be an attempt to transfer existing uses
to other uses or to uses outside the state, 4 ' without requiring
special legislative approval. 4 '
Furthermore, no guidelines, rules, or regulations are
set out which are to guide the legislature in rendering any
decision. When a statute prohibits an activity which touches
interstate commerce, and does not set out such guidelines,
rules, or regulations, it is placing an unreasonable burden
No substantial or significant
upon interstate commerce.'
local interest is served by placing this additional burden
upon potential out of state users. At its worst, this requirement makes a subjective and political decision out of a matter
which should be decided objectively at an administrative level
in accordance with all the available scientific data and in conformity with existing statutory guidelines and mandates.
Thus, the burden of requiring legislative approval only for
potential uses outside the state serves no useful purpose. It
serves only to duplicate procedures and requirements already
provided for by statute. Such a requirement discriminates
against one kind of use of Wyoming water without substantial justification.1 and is clearly excessive in relation to any
putative local benefit."'
In sum, subsection (a) is constitutionally permissible because it expresses a substantial local interest over which the
state may exercise its police power. Subsection (b), it is contended, is unconstitutional in two respects. First, it creates
an unreasonable burden upon and an interference with interstate commerce because its requirement of legislative approval for any out of state use is an excessive requirement in relation to the local benefit set out in subsection (a). Secondly,
148. WYO. STAT. § 41-4.1 (Supp. 1973).
149. A review of the so-called "ETSI" provisions of Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-10.5(d),
(e), (f) (Supp. 1974) shows that the legislature has basically required of
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. only those things already required by
existing statutes of appropriators. The only exception is that the legislature
.has..required the -appropriator -to draw its-water from-a source below a
certain depth in the Madison Formation. Such a requirement could just
as easily have been placed upon the appropriator by the State Engineer.
150. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1972).

151. Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 47.
152. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra note 119, at 142.
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subsection (b) is unconstitutional because the use of water as
a medium of transportation bears such a close and subtantial
relation to interstate commerce that the burden of the requirement of legislative approval prior to such a use is inimical to
commerce.' 53 For the same reasons, that portion of subsection
(c) which requires specific legislative approval before any
transfer of appropriated water can be made for use outside
the state is also unconstitutional.
However, it is suggested that the unique attributes of
water and the special treatment which it has received at the
hands of the Federal Congress, the courts, and the states, may
permit the state to regulate the use of its waters outside the
state, even to the extent that such regulation may burden or
interfere with interstate commerce. For example, it ought
to be possible for the state to say, if it chooses, that no state
water may be used as a medium of transportation for mineral,
chemical or other products, either inside or outside the state.
That is, the state should be permitted to say such a use is
not a beneficial use so long as it does not say it is not a
beneficial use only when the water is to go out of state. The
state, it is contended, should also be able to require that
no state waters may be appropriated for use outside its
boundaries unless the benefiting state provides reciprocal
rights for Wyoming citizens. Finally, the state should be
given wide latitude in adopting those laws governing the use
of water which it considers necessary to obtain the maximum
benefits, both social and economic, from the use of its most
valuable resource and in designing its law so as to permit
people to do some things that will advance this aim and to
prevent people from doing those things that would be contrary to this maximization ideal."'
CONCLU ION

Currently, two divergent views are taken of water as a
natural resource. One view is that of McCartorwhich would
153. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 71, at 769.
154. Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water Law in Conserving
and Developing Natural Resources in the West, 18 WYO. L.J. 3, 4 (1963).
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give a state virtually unlimited control over its Water where
interstate commerce is involved. The other view is that of
Altus which would treat water like any other natural resource
and which would not permit the state to restrict its use in
interstate commerce to any greater degree than is permitted
for other natural resources. , This paper has suggested that,
while it is doubtful that Altus is the law with respect to interstate use of water, it is also doubtful that the unlimited control permitted by McCarter remains viable in all respects.
Rather, it is suggested that any statute which seeks to
rcstrict or prohibit the: movement of waters found entirely
within a state's boundaries bereviewed with two concepts in
mind. The first is that the statute is to be considered in
light of current doctrine relative: to interstate commerce and
the reach of the commerce clause. The second is that such a
review be made with the ideas that water is a unique natural
resource which has traditionally been treated specially by
both the federal and the state governments and the courts and
that such special treatment should justify the state's placing
greater burdens upon interstate commerce. for the purpose
of protecting the public welfare of its residents without violating the commerce clause.
In light of these concepts, it. is probable that the major
provisions of the Wyoming statute are. unconstitutional.
Much*of what it attempts to do is redundant in light of existing statutes. - The entire thrust of the -statute is misdirected.
The- concern should not be -whether a: particular use is to be
in-state or out of state. The concern should be whether, the
use to which the waterT is, to be put will help to effectuate the
maximum social and economic benefits for the residents of
the state.15 5 The concern should be whether the state's resources are to be developed or are to be left on the shelf.'5 6
GEORGE A. ZUNKER

155. Id. at 4.
156. Trelease, 8upra note 9, at 198.
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